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Containing Systemic Risk:
New Developments in Trans-Atlantic
Hedge Fund Regulation
MICHAEL MCDONALD∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Operating as part of the so-called “shadow banking system,”1
hedge funds have evolved to become titans of the modern global
financial industry. Not only do hedge funds attract some of the brightest
minds in finance and often provide historically superior returns to their
investors, but their enormous size can also provide them with
tremendous influence over the course of global financial markets.
Today, however, the familiar regulatory environment in which fund
managers have traditionally operated is in the process of unprecedented
change. The severity of the 2008 credit crisis and its aftermath have
forced market regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to address the
failures associated with existing regulatory standards, identify new
regulatory goals, and adjust international standards accordingly. Despite
the prevailing view that hedge funds played only a marginal role in
facilitating the onset of the crisis, the industry’s enormous size has
made it too hard for policymakers to ignore.2 As a result, there has been
a renewed emphasis on removing the “cloak of secrecy” that has often
surrounded hedge fund activity.3
∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, 2011; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to
express my sincerest gratitude to all of the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review for all of their dedication, diligence, and patience in
helping publish this Note.
1. See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING, Staff
Rep.
No.
458,
at
13
(2010),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf.
2. Adam Smith, Should Hedge Funds Face Harsher Regulation?, TIME, July 8, 2010,
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1909026,00.html.
3. Bigger, Safer but Duller: A Secretive Industry Opens Up to Meet the Demands of
Investors and Regulators, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com
/node/16891973/print [hereinafter Bigger, Safer but Duller].
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In the United States and the European Union (EU), this trend was
initially predicated upon the desire to achieve regulatory
“harmonization” to prevent the harmful effects of regulatory arbitrage.4
This process, however, has proven difficult in light of each region’s
individual assessment of the appropriate balance between the promotion
of resilient and sustainable markets with that of economic growth and
innovation.5 For this reason, many commentators have argued
throughout this process that the two regions have actually taken
divergent paths.6
This Note will explore the question of whether the United States
and the EU have achieved their respective goals of establishing an
effective, unified body of financial reform measures that address hedge
fund activity and its broad impact on the financial markets. In particular,
this analysis will focus on these measures as they address the primary
concerns regarding the relationship between hedge funds and the buildup of systemic risk within the financial system. Part II begins with a
review of some of the basic characteristics that distinguish hedge funds
from other types of investment vehicles and will consider the following
areas: the structure of hedge funds, fund investment strategies, and fund
investor pools. Part III will then identify the ways in which large hedge
funds can present a systemic threat to stability of the international
financial system as a whole.
Part IV will undertake a comparative analysis of both the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) in the United States and the recent agreement on the Alternative
Investment Fund Managers Directive in the EU (“AIFMD”). This will
be accomplished by comparing the following areas: 1) the aims and
background of each set of reforms; and 2) how these approaches address
the regulatory concerns over systemic risk and, by extension, the
suitability of these approaches in light of the unique challenges that
4. Andreas Engert, Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation, 11 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
277,
362
(2010),
available
at
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=7923084&jid=EBR&volumeId
=11&issueId=03&aid=7923083 (“Regulatory arbitrage describes how participants in the hedge
fund industry react to regulation if they perceive it as costly.”).
5. Anthony Faiola & Brady Dennis, U.S., Europe Fall out of Step on Global Financial
Reform, WASH. POST., May 26, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/25/AR2010052505316.html.
6. Id.; see Oxford Analytica, E.U., U.S. Investing Regulations Diverge, FORBES.COM,
(Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/05/united-states-european-union-investmentbusiness-oxford.html; see also Martin Arnold, Brooke Masters & Nikki Tait, Investing:
Alternative Visions, FIN. TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f93da592-5ec411df-af86-00144feab49a.html#axzz1yGyCFepS [hereinafter Investing: Alternative Visions].
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regulation of this area entail. Ultimately, this Note takes the position
that although there remain some areas of divergence, the financial
reforms adopted by the United States and the EU essentially converge
and represent modest, yet realistic standards for mitigating the
industry’s potential to inflict harmful externalities on the financial
system.
II. WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND? AN “INDUSTRY” TERM
Despite its prevalence, a commonly accepted definition of a
“hedge fund” does not exist.7 Instead, hedge funds are often
characterized by what they are not. In the United States, for example,
hedge funds have been defined to the extent by which they fall under an
exception to the federal securities laws. Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defined a hedge fund as
“an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose
interests are not sold in a registered public offering and which is not
registered as an investment company under the Investment Company
Act.”8 Similarly, the EU has simply categorized hedge funds as
“alternative investments” that do not require authorization as
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities
(UCITS) under Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EC.9 While these narrow
definitions may serve legislative purposes, they fail to capture both the
structure and complexity of fund investment activities and are,
therefore, of limited use. For these reasons, the definition of a hedge
fund as an “industry” term is more instructive.10 According to this
classification, the term “hedge fund” encompasses the three
fundamental components inherent in most hedge funds: their legal
organization, investment strategy, and investor profiles.11

7. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF
REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 3 (2003) [hereinafter IMPLICATIONS], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
8. George Sami, A Comparative Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States
and Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 275, 277 (2009).
9. Press Release, European Council, Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers
(“AIFMD”): Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Frequently Asked
Questions],
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/572&type=HTML.
10. Michael J. Schmidt, Investor Protection in Europe and the United States: Impacting the
Future of Hedge Funds, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 161, 162 (2007).
11. Id.; see also Sargon Daniel, Yesterday’s Regulatory Schemes for Today’s Investment
Vehicles, 27 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 247, 251 (2007).
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A. Hedge Fund Structure
A hedge fund is a pool of assets collected from both institutional
and accredited investors that is administered by a fund manager.12 In
return for their investment into the fund, investors receive a share of the
pooled assets and, by extension, the fund’s profits.13 Today, almost all
hedge funds in the United States and the EU are organized as limited
liability corporations or limited partnerships.14 This structure provides
hedge fund managers with the ability to maintain a high level of control
over the fund’s investment strategy and minimize tax-exposure, while
also allowing them to invest their own money into the fund.15 The
majority of hedge fund entities are set up in the Cayman Islands to take
advantage of the country’s favorable tax incentives.16 Most funds,
however, are “managed” in the United States, followed by the United
Kingdom,17 and increasingly, Singapore and Hong Kong.18
B. Hedge Fund Investment Strategies
As the name suggests, fund managers often “hedge” against the
inherent risks associated with their investments using a variety of
techniques. A “hedge” essentially involves taking an investment
position in a security while, at the same time, offsetting that position
with another investment.19 This can be done using both long and short
investment strategies.20 Although hedging is a method designed to
12. Engert, supra note 4, at 333.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 355.
15. Id. See also Dustin G. Hall, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 188 (2008).
16. Lartease Tiffith, Hedge Fund Regulation: What the FSA Is Doing Right and Why the
SEC Should Follow the FSA’s Lead, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 497, 500 (2007).
17. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at 162. Specifically, forty out of the fifty largest European
hedge funds are currently headquartered in the United Kingdom. See Bill McIntosh, Europe
50: Europe’s Largest Single Managers Ranked by AUM, HEDGE FUND J. (Sept. 2010),
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/201009/research/the-europe-50-2010-.php
[hereinafter Europe 50].
18. See Netty Ismail, Singapore’s New Hedge-Fund Regulation Puts City ‘Back on Map,’
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/singaporehedge-fund-regulations-lure-managers-put-city-back-on-the-map-.html; Saeed Azhar & Parvathy
Ullatil, Seeking Less Scrutiny, Hedge Funds Flock to Asia, REUTERS (May 17, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/17/us-asia-hedgefunds-analysisidUSTRE64G31W20100517.
19. Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The Changing Landscape of Hedge Fund Regulation: Current
Concerns and a Principle-Based Approach, 10 U. PA. J. BUS, & EMP. L. 833, 834 (2008).
20. A commonly used practice, short selling, is a procedure in which the fund manager will
“borrow” a security from a lender and bet that the value of the security will decline. Upon doing
so, the manager will then sell the security and buy back the lower priced security and return it to

2011]

Containing Systemic Risk

241

minimize investment risk, investing in hedge funds can actually entail a
higher degree of risk compared with other forms of investment, such as
mutual funds, because of their tendency to pursue a more aggressive
investment strategy.21 This is due, in large part, to the fact that hedge
fund managers seek to maximize absolute return to their investors rather
than measure fund performance relative to a designated financial
benchmark or index.22 In doing so, many fund managers utilize highly
complex, proprietary investment strategies that typically incorporate a
variety of asset classes.23 Depending on the type of fund, these asset
classes often involve the use of complex financial instruments in the
form of options, derivatives, and leverage.24
Regardless of the fund’s investment philosophy, fund managers
may also incorporate the use of economic leverage into their investment
strategy. Defined as the practice of purchasing “stocks or other
investments by using borrowed funds (on margin),” leverage can assist
certain funds in providing the highest possible rate of return to its
investors.25 Typically, hedge funds obtain financial leverage through the
use of repurchase agreements, short positions, and derivatives.26 While
not all hedge funds use leverage, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has found that hedge funds “account for more than 40%
of the trading volume in the U.S. leverage loan market” and more than
85% of the distressed debt market.27
Overall, hedge funds pursue a wide-range of investment strategies
that cover essentially every corner of the financial market. Not
surprisingly, direct regulation of fund manager activity is thus
exceedingly difficult because of the diverse nature of fund activities and
the lender. If timed correctly, the fund manager will have captured the “spread” between the value
of the security at the time that it was sold and the value at the time that it was repurchased and
replaced. Although politically unpopular, particularly in Europe, short selling can play a
beneficial role in facilitating market rationalization and market liquidity. Daniel, supra note 11, at
252.
21. See Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds’ Regulation by Size, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 657, 665 (2008).
22. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at viii.
23. See Matthew Goldstein, A Secret Society: Hedge Funds and Their Mysterious Success, 6
J. INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 114 (2007).
24. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at 163.
25. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD FINANCE AND INVESTMENT DICTIONARY 194 (1st ed. 2003).
26. HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, 4–5
(Apr. 1999), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf.
27. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-200, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS
AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT
CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED 1 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08200.pdf.
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the ways in which their strategies straddle the boundaries of both
regulated and un-regulated market activities.
C. Hedge Fund Investors and Fees
Due to the risks often associated with a more aggressive
investment strategy, hedge funds have traditionally been the exclusive
domain of high net-worth and institutional investors.28 In both the
United States and the EU, hedge funds are prohibited from soliciting
investments from the general public, and instead must raise capital from
private accredited investors via private placement offerings.29 In order to
invest in a hedge fund in the United States, for example, the investor
must be an “accredited investor,” which requires an individual or jointspouse net-worth of one million dollars.30 Similarly, EU investors must
meet the criteria of a “professional investor.”31 These entry barriers are
comparatively high because these investors should possess a higher
degree of financial sophistication and are therefore better able to
withstand the elevated risk associated with a more aggressive
investment strategy.32
In addition to these statutory requirements, most hedge funds also
maintain a minimum investment threshold of at least one million dollars
and include certain time frames in which investors may not withdraw
their money from the fund.33 Today, however, institutional investors
such as pension funds and insurance companies are also heavily
invested in the hedge fund market—thereby allowing non-qualifying
investors to participate through the back door.34
28. However, the recent trend is for institutional investors rather than the high net-worth,
“professional” investors to dominate hedge fund investor pools. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at
163; see also John Horsfield-Bradbury, Hedge Fund Self-Regulation in the U.S. and the UK 8
(Harvard Law Sch. Victor Brudney Prize in Corporate Governance Paper, 2008), available at
http://law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_centr/corporate_governance/papers/Brudney2008_Horsfield
-Bradbury.pdf.
29. Alex Hood, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2008–2009, 28 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 61, 63 (2009).
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (West 2011).
31. See Council Directive 2011/61, arts. 31(6), 32(9), 35(17), 39(11), 40(17), 2011 O.J.
(L/174) 1 (EU).
32. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at 163, 166–67.
33. Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of American and
British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 359 (2008). From a regulatory
standpoint, these traditional entry barriers are commonly referred to as the “indirect regulation
approach.” See also Schmidt, supra note 10, at 166–67.
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND U.S. AGENCY
PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL § 5
(2007),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hp272_principles.pdf
[hereinafter PWG AGREEMENT].
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In addition to entry barriers, the fee structure common to most
hedge funds provides yet another important mechanism that limits the
pool of fund investors. As one might expect, investing in a hedge fund
is expensive. Typical fees include a charge of 1–3% of the assets under
management, assessed on behalf of the fund advisor, as well as an
additional charge of 10–30% of the fund’s yearly appreciation in
value.35 These fee arrangements are based on the absolute performance
of the fund, which can potentially result in a very high level of
compensation for fund managers.36 Accordingly, these fee structures can
incentivize excessive risk taking.37 Through these highly lucrative fee
arrangements, hedge fund managers have become some of the highest
compensated figures in the world. For example, John Paulson, advisor
to the Paulson and Co. hedge fund, made a record four billion dollars in
2008 in personal compensation from fees stemming from a single
trade.38
III. HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK
The term “systemic risk” can be roughly defined as the risk
attributable to a certain market participant or segment and its
corresponding negative-potential impact on another market participant,
segment, or economy as a whole.39 Correspondingly, a “systemic event”
is defined as an event where “shocks to one part of the financial system
lead to shocks elsewhere, impinging on the stability of the real
economy.”40 These “shocks” can lead to the reduction, if not
elimination, of capital market flows and liquidity needed to run
everyday business activity.41 Systemic risk is particularly problematic
because individual investors and firms cannot “protect themselves at
reasonable cost as long as they participate, directly or indirectly, in the
financial markets.”42
The near-collapse of the first major hedge fund, Long Term
35. Oppold, supra note 19 at 837.
36. See John Kambhu et al., Hedge Funds, Financial Intermediation, and Systemic Risk, 13
ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2007).
37. Id. at 4.
38. GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE GREATEST TRADE EVER: THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES
STORY OF HOW JOHN PAULSON DEFIED WALL STREET AND MADE FINANCIAL HISTORY 254
(2009).
39. See Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 5–6.
40. Id. at 5 (citing Michael D. Bordo, et al, Real Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk:
Some Lessons from History (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 5371,
1995).
41. Engert, supra note 4, at 342.
42. See id. at 339.
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Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, provides a prime example of the
systemic problems that can result from the failure of a large hedge
fund.43 In the exceptional case of LTCM, a combination of high-amount
leverage and market volatility prompted investors and counterparties
alike to liquidate their holdings in the fund to the point that LTCM
could not cover its liabilities and the Federal Reserve and other private
banks had to bail out LTCM.44 In the United States, the severity of the
LTCM collapse prompted the first major debate concerning the need for
greater oversight over hedge fund activity and led to the creation of the
President’s Working Group (PWG) to study the impact of the hedge
fund industry on financial markets.45 In the wake of the most recent
crisis, the desire to mitigate the systemic risk associated with massive
pools of lightly regulated capital has been the overriding justification
for subjecting hedge funds to a higher level of regulatory scrutiny.46
So how does a hedge fund present a systemic risk to the “real
economy?” Generally, hedge funds can pose a systemic risk to the
stability of the financial system in two fundamental ways: 1) the
potential for counterparties to sustain extensive losses in the event of a
hedge fund failure; and, 2) the potential for disorderly market pricing in
the event that a large hedge fund rapidly unwinds its investment
positions.47
A. The Limits of Market Discipline: Hedge Funds
and Counterparty Exposure
Because hedge funds invest in a wide array of financial
instruments, often with the use of significant amounts of leverage,
losses—like gains—are accordingly amplified.48 In 2007, for example,
43. See Goldstein, supra note 23, at 118 (“LTCM’s loss resulted from using borrowed
money to purchase about $120 billion of its estimated $125 billion in assets . . . .”).
44. Id.; see also Private-Sector Refinancing of the Large Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital
Management: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 3–6 (1998)
(testimony
of
Chairman
Alan
Greenspan),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.htm.
45.
Id. at 5; see also Chairman of the High-Level Grp. on Fin. Supervision in the EU, The
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Report (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (similarly, in the
aftermath of the credit crisis, the EU created the so-called “High Level Group on Financial
Supervision” (“Larosière Report”) which recommended that hedge funds be required to disclose
their strategies, use of leverage, and their “worldwide activities.”).
46. See EU Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9, at 1 (“Given the global nature of their
activities, many risks posed by the AIFM have an important cross-border dimension.”).
47. See Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 7–8.
48. Timothy Geithner, President, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address at the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority: Hedge Funds and Derivatives and Their Implications for the Financial System (Sept.
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the average leverage ratio for the hedge fund industry as a whole was
1.7 times the value of the fund’s underlying assets.49 By utilizing
economic leverage, hedge funds typically maintain relationships with a
number of other financial institutions (“counterparties”) that provide
credit services, such as trading and execution, clearance and custody,
and financing services.50 These services are usually provided by banks
or prime brokers and constitute an estimated multi-billion dollar
industry.51 In return for extending credit to a particular fund, fund
managers are required to provide collateral assets that can be liquidated
in the event that the fund cannot cover its investment positions.52
According to the GAO, hedge funds often provide collateral in the
form of highly liquid securities or cash. Less often, funds will also
provide collateral through lower rated or less liquid securities.53 By
extending credit to a fund, the counterparty remains directly exposed to
the risk of having the value of the fund’s collateral fall below the level
needed to cover the fund’s liabilities should it become necessary.54 For
this reason, the liquidity of the collateral and the degree to which these
institutions have implemented sound risk management policies are
significant factors in curtailing the potentially dangerous exposure to
counterparty, and, by extension, systemic risk.55 Commonly referred to
as “market discipline,”56 these constraints reside within each
institution’s policies concerning margin and collateral requirements and
14,
2006),
available
at
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/speechspeakers/tfgeithner/20060915-1.shtml (“Private pools of capital have the capacity to use
extensive leverage to amplify returns.”).
49. Hedge Funds Oversight: Conclusion Report, TECHNICAL COMM’N OF THE INT’L ORG.
OF SEC. COMM’NS 17 (Mar. 2009), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf
[hereinafter IOSCO Report] (this ratio fell to 1.4 times as of October 2008, however).
50. Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 3; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 7 (“[M]ost
large hedge funds use multiple prime brokers as service providers. Thus, no one broker may have
all the data necessary to assess the total leverage used by a hedge fund client.”).
51. See IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at viii. See also Bradley Keoun, Morgan Stanley
Speculating to Brink of Collapse Got $107 Billion from Fed, BLOOMBERG.COM,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-22/morgan-stanley-at-brink-of-collapse-got-107bfrom-fed.html.
52. GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 30.
53. Id.
54. See Engert, supra note 4, at 340; see also Kambhu, supra note 36, at 3.
55. Geithner, supra note 48.
56. See GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 26. Additionally, the adherence to the market
discipline approach stems from the free market principles, which hold that private parties have the
strongest “incentives to monitor counterparties as well as the best access to the information
needed to do so effectively.” Nell Henderson, Fed Urges Banks to Monitor Hedge Funds, WASH.
POST
(May
17,
2006),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051601745.html.
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dictate the terms on which the counterparty will transact with a
particular fund.57
Although market discipline comprises the "first [and most
important] line of defense between unregulated hedge funds and
regulated financial institutions,” guarding against excessive risk-taking,
a number of mitigating factors also influence this form of indirect
regulation.58 First, in order for market discipline to be effective,
counterparties must have access to information regarding the fund’s risk
profile, as well as having the institutional mechanisms in place to limit
the firm’s exposure to it.59 Traditionally, however, “the desire” for
hedge funds to keep their market activities “confidential” can limit the
flow of fund-specific information and has earned hedge funds a
reputation for “opacity.”60
Until the recent passage of the financial reform in the United
States and the EU, hedge funds that fell under an exception to the
existing securities laws have not been required by law to publicly
disclose information relating to the activities of the fund.61 The extent to
which some hedge funds receive their financing from multiple
counterparties compounds this problem. By maintaining relationships
with several parties, each individual creditor may be exposed to only a
small proportion of the hedge fund’s overall position, which can affect
that institution’s assessment of the risk.62 According to U.S. Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner, “[t]his gives individual firms an incentive
to free-ride on the due diligence or monitoring by others, which may
render resultant collective discipline inadequate.”63 Moreover, market
competition within the multi-billion dollar prime-brokerage industry
helps ensure that the market standards are under constant downward
pressure.64 Overall, because these inherent limitations can only be
overcome by collective action, the burden of containing systemic risk
must predominantly reside at the governmental level.65

57. See Kambhu, supra note 36, at 3–4.
58. Id.
59. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bank, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm.
60. See Geithner, supra note 48.
61. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 33, at 351–55.
62. See Geithner, supra note 48.
63. Id.
64. See IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at 40. See also Keoun, supra note 51.
65. Engert, supra note 4, at 332.
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B. The Relationship Between Hedge Fund Size and the Build-up of
Systemic Risk
In addition to the problem of free-riding, the sheer size of some of
the largest hedge funds can present a systemic risk to the financial
system. Although hedge funds only comprise an estimated 5 percent of
all U.S. assets under management, they account for an estimated 30
percent of all U.S. equity trading volume, as well as an estimated 4050% of the daily equity volume on major international markets.66 The
primary consequence of this inverse ratio is that hedge funds can
generate “externalities,” which can negatively impact not only those
parties in privity with the fund, but also market participants with whom
the fund shares no relationship.67 This problem primarily occurs in two
ways. First, the problem occurs where a highly leveraged fund sustains
a significant loss that negatively affects the creditor counterparty’s
liquidity.68 This loss can impair the transacting party’s ability to provide
financing to other market participants who depend on that lender’s
capacity to extend credit.69 Second, and perhaps more importantly, some
of the largest hedge funds have the ability to significantly alter market
price movements due to their enormous size.70
The International Organization of Securities Commissions notes
that the ability for hedge funds to take concentrated positions in certain
investments (compounded by the use of leverage) can “exacerbate”
market volatility and lead to “disorderly asset pricing.”71 Here, losses
sustained by a large fund may result in large sell-offs (“fire sales”) that
can depress market prices, which, in turn, can cause other market
participants to sustain significant losses.72 According to a 2008 GAO
report on the hedge fund industry, “[i]f numerous market participants
establish large positions on the same side of a trade, especially in
combination with a high degree of leverage, this concentration can
66. Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon –
Don’t
Shoot
the
Messenger
(June
18,
2009)
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809laa.htm [hereinafter Aguilar]; see also Lewis,
supra note 33, at 361.
67. Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 11 (“An externality is the impact of one party’s action
on others who are not directly involved in the transaction.”).
68. See id. at 7.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 11.
71. Geithner, supra note 48; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 35 (noting that the
concentration of large positions on the same side of a trade can contribute to a liquidity crisis if
traders are compelled to simultaneously unwind their positions).
72. See Engert, supra note 4, at 341–42.
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contribute to a liquidity crisis if market conditions compel traders to
simultaneously unwind their positions.”73 This problem is particularly
apparent when this covariance involves short-selling. At the height of
the credit crisis in September of 2008, for example, artificially negative
price movements, largely the result of “naked” short-selling by
institutional investors, helped facilitate the rapid deterioration of market
conditions.74 This decline was so severe that the SEC took the
extraordinary measure of issuing an emergency order prohibiting fund
managers from engaging in the practice of “naked” short-selling.75 As
this episode highlighted, in the absence of tighter regulatory controls,
institutions may lack the incentive to “internalize” the effects of this
unwinding on the market because fund managers have a greater
incentive to minimize financial losses.76 Consequently, some observers
have argued that the direct regulation of hedge funds should be enacted
to limit the size of the hedge fund’s assets under management.77
In addition to the systemic risks that some of the largest funds can
present, the increasing number of hedge funds may also have a
destabilizing effect on market pricing as fund positions become
increasingly concentrated.78 Since Alfred Jones established the first
hedge fund with one hundred thousand dollars in 1949, the number of
hedge funds has grown exponentially, particularly since the 1990s.79 In
1990, an estimated three hundred hedge funds managed a total of thirtynine billion dollars in combined assets.80 As of 2007, the number of
hedge funds grew to an estimated ten thousand, with a total value of
assets under management of $2.079 trillion.81 The industry’s remarkable
73. GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 35.
74. Id.
75. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-58592, at 2.
76. See Geithner, supra note 48; see also Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 7 (“If a bank has a
large exposure to a hedge fund that defaults or operates in markets where prices are falling
rapidly, the bank’s . . . exposure may reduce its ability or willingness to extend credit to worthy
borrowers.”).
77. See Frankel, supra note 21, at 659.
78. Tobias Adrian, Measuring Risk in the Hedge Fund Sector: Current Issues in Economics
and
Finance,
13
FED.
RES.
BANK
3,
Mar.–Apr.
2007,
at
1,
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/current_issues/ci13-3.pdf (“A key determinant of hedge fund risk
is the degree of similarity between the trading strategies of different funds.”).
79. Aguilar, supra note 66.
80. Daniel, supra note 11, at 253.
81. Oppold, supra note 19, at 840; KYLA MALCOLM, ET AL., IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED
AIFM
DIRECTIVE
ACROSS
EUROPE
15
(2009),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/Impact_of_AIFM_Directive.pdf. At the time of writing, hedge
fund assets under management totaled $1.917 trillion. Margot Patrick, Hedge-Fund Assets Hit
$1.917 Trillion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487
04590704576091872684789648.html. Ironically, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act’s creation of
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growth, however, has produced a growing body of evidence that
suggests that greater levels of hedge fund “covariance” often precede
higher levels of hedge fund volatility.82 This hedge fund covariance is
primarily because continued growth of the industry may negatively
impact a fund’s level of return as market positions become “saturated.”83
As fund positions become concentrated in certain market areas, fund
managers may decide to incorporate a greater degree of leverage into
their investment strategies in order to provide a competitive rate of
return.84
IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
The first half of this Note has provided both an overview of the
defining characteristics of the term “hedge fund” and the inherent
challenges that these funds present to the stability of the financial
system. Focus will now shift to the most recent regulatory measures
passed in both the United States and the EU as these reforms relate to
the relationship between hedge funds and systemic risk. The following
comparative analysis will consider the respective reforms in the
following areas: 1) the aims and structure of each set of reforms; and,
2) how effectively these reforms address the concerns over systemic
risk.
A. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
1. The Dodd-Frank Act: Aims and Background
According to the preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act, the act is
intended “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to
end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices,
and for other purposes.”85
the Volker Rule, which bans proprietary trading on behalf of bank holding companies, the
number of hedge funds, and presumably the amount of assets under management, is expected to
increase as a greater number of former “prop traders” enter into the industry. Murray Coleman,
Financial Reforms Expected to Boost Number of Hedge Funds, BARRON’S (Oct. 15, 2010, 2:38
PM),
http://blogs.barrons.com/focusonfunds/2010/10/15/financial-reforms-expected-to-boost
number-of-hedge-funds/.
82. Adrian, supra note 78, at 6.
83. Schmidt, supra note 10, at 170.
84. Id.; see MALCOLM, supra note 81, at 85.
85. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
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The Dodd-Frank Act, which became effective on July 21, 2011,
has been described as the most comprehensive financial reform
legislation passed in the United States since the federal securities laws
established in the 1930s.86 While the legislation itself is new, the act’s
proscriptions are not.
As it relates to hedge funds, the act builds upon the PWG’s
recommendations set forth in the aftermath of the LTCM meltdown.87 In
its 2007 final report entitled, “Principles and Guidelines Regarding
Private Pools of Capital,” the PWG called for a principle-based
regulatory approach that “affirms that ‘market discipline,’ supplemented
by compliance with ‘industry sound practice,’ is the touchstone of
hedge-fund regulatory policy.”88 Although the report stressed the need
for greater transparency at the investor level, it did not specifically
address the more important relationship between hedge funds and their
trading counterparties.89 Moreover, the report’s integrity suffered from
the fact that the implementation of its recommendations remained
purely voluntary.90
The Dodd-Frank Act’s call for hedge fund registration and
increased disclosure can also trace its roots to the SEC’s short-lived
“hedge fund rule” implemented in late 2004.91 Intended to eliminate the
“Investment Advisor exemption,” the hedge fund rule modified the
definition of a “client” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(IAA) by allowing regulators to “look through” the fund and count each
investor as a “client” rather than only counting the fund itself.92 The
latter system allowed fund managers to escape SEC registration by
relying on the IAA’s exemption for advisors with less than fifteen
clients.93 In a controversial 2006 opinion, the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein
v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n struck down the existing rule on the grounds
that the term “client” under the IAA only applied to the investment
124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
86. VIRAL V. ACHARYA, ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET 359 (2010).
87. See PWG AGREEMENT, supra note 34, at 25 (noting that market discipline by creditors,
counterparties, and investors is the most effective mechanism for limiting systemic risk from
private pools of capital).
88. John P. Hunt, Hedge Fund Regulation: The President’s Working Group Committees’
Best Practices Reports – Raising the Bar but Missing Risks 5 (Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus. & the
Econ.,
Working
Paper,
2008)
[hereinafter
Hunt],
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279870.
89. See id. at 9–10, 16; see also PWG AGREEMENT, supra note 34, at 32.
90. See Hunt, supra note 88, at 6.
91. Lewis, supra note 33, at 370.
92. Id.
93. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80B-3 (2012).
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entity itself and not the number of actual investors in the fund.94
Consequently, until Dodd-Frank was passed, hedge fund managers were
not required to register with the SEC as long as they managed fewer
than fifteen “entities.”95
More recently, the magnitude of the financial crisis helped forge
a general consensus to increase disclosure as a necessary predicate for
establishing a more stable financial system.96 As a result, with the aim
of strengthening investor confidence, U.S. policy makers began the
process of reforming the hedge fund industry by making fund manager
activity more transparent at both the investor and counterparty levels.97
It was clear from the beginning, however, that the market-based
regulatory approach would remain as the cornerstone of U.S. regulatory
policy and that the main focus would be on identifying the segment of
funds that should be subject to greater regulatory oversight.98 In
narrowing their focus, lawmakers rejected proposals to impose tighter
restrictions on trade activity or to impose a tax on systemic risk—a clear
manifestation of Congress’s desire to achieve a “balance” between the
need for greater transparency and the desire to maintain U.S.
preeminence within the industry.99
2. The Dodd-Frank Act: Regulatory Approach
In the United States, regulatory reforms related to the hedge fund
industry are contained in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.100 According
to Section 402 of Title IV, a hedge fund is essentially characterized as a
“private fund” under the Investment Company Act of 1940.101
Consequently, a hedge fund will now be considered an investment
company that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting,
or trading in securities.”102 Structurally, Title IV modifies the IAA by
94. Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
95. Id.
96. See Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing
Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before
H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 42 (2009) (statement of Stuart Kaswell, Executive
Vice President, Managed Funds Association) [hereinafter Kaswell Statement].
97. See Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing Before H. Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, of the H. Committee on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 1–3 (2009).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 5–6.
100. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 401 et seq.
101. Id. § 402(b).
102. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2004).
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using the size of the fund’s assets under management as the determining
factor regarding whether the fund manager will be required to register
with the SEC.103 By implementing this “tiered” approach, the DoddFrank Act reflects the industry’s prevailing view that only the largest
hedge funds can present the types of systemic risk that the Act is
intended to prevent.104
3. Addressing the Concerns Regarding Counterparty Risk and
Disorderly Market Pricing
The Dodd-Frank Act intends to mitigate counterparty risk by
addressing hedge fund manager activity rather than directly regulating
the fund itself.105 Central to the Act’s approach is the requirement that,
for the first time, managers who oversee the largest hedge funds must
register with the SEC.106 Section 408, however, specifies that hedge
fund managers who act solely as an advisor to “private funds”107 will be
subject to federal registration only if their assets under management
exceed $150 million.108 Consequently, Section 408 will exclude
approximately 82 percent of U.S. managed hedge funds from increased
federal oversight.109 For those funds whose assets exceed the $150
million threshold, the Act effectively eliminates the “private investment
advisor exemption” in the IAA (and Goldstein opinion), which allowed
funds to evade disclosure if the fund had less than fifteen “clients.”110
By closing this regulatory loophole, Section 404 now requires these
fund managers to provide information (using a revised Form ADV) to
the SEC on an annual basis regarding:
(A) the amount of assets under management and use of leverage,
including off-balance-sheet leverage;
(B) counterparty credit risk exposure;
(C) trading and investment positions;

103. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 401, 408.
104. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Opening Statement SEC Open Meeting: Private Fund Systemic Risk Reporting (Jan. 25, 2011).
105. MARK JICKLING & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41398, THE
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII,
DERIVATIVES 2 (2010), available at www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/239/CRS-R41398.pdf.
106. See Dodd-Frank Act § 408.
107. Under § 402 of the Dodd-Frank Act, “private fund” is defined as “an issuer that would
be an investment company under Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. §
80a-3).”
108. Dodd-Frank Act § 408. In addition, § 410 of the Dodd-Frank Act raises the threshold for
federal registration of all investment advisors from $25 million to $100 million.
109. See ACHARYA, supra note 86, at 359.
110. Investment Company Act § 80b-3(b)(3).
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(D) valuation policies and practices of the fund;
(E) types of assets held;
(F) side arrangements [(side pocket agreements)] . . . ; [and]
111
(G) [the fund’s] trading practices[.]

In addition, registration pursuant to the IAA requires the
implementation of, among other things, a compliance program, an
insider trading policy, and a code of ethics.112
As a complement to Section 404’s informational requirements, the
section also provides the SEC with the authority to require fund
managers to provide additional information that the Commission may
consider to be of public interest.113 Currently, the SEC is proposing that
“large” hedge fund managers with over $1 billion in assets under
management provide quarterly reports using a newly proposed reporting
form (Form PF).114 As it stands, the rule would apply to an estimated
two hundred funds, which, in the aggregate, manage about 80 percent of
all hedge fund assets.115
The prospect of forced disclosure was met with concerns from
many fund managers over the confidentiality of the fund’s proprietary
investment information.116 In particular, the ability to compile and
disseminate asymmetrical information is a key component in
maintaining a competitive advantage for those funds whose investment
strategies rely upon the theory of market inefficiency.117 This is because
these funds’ investment strategies are often predicated on exploiting
market price discrepancies to secure short-term gains.118 Accordingly,
public disclosure of this information would essentially neutralize the
fund manager’s ability (and incentive) to realize gains using this type of
investment approach. For this reason, Section 404 exempts “proprietary
information” from public disclosure even though the SEC and the
FSOC will review this information.119
Disclosure will have an effect on the extent to which
counterparties are willing to transact with a particular fund in addition
111.
112.
113.
114.

Dodd-Frank Act § 404.
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80B-3(c) (2012).
Dodd-Frank Act § 413.
See SEC Proposes Private Fund Systemic Risk Reporting Rule, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-23.htm.
115. Id.
116. See Kaswell Statement, supra note 96, at 42.
117. See Lewis, supra note 33, at 357.
118. Id.
119. Dodd-Frank Act § 404 (characterizing “proprietary information” as including investment
strategies, analytical and research methodologies, trading data, and computer software containing
intellectual property).
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to its effects on fund managers from monetary costs associated with
compliance.120 The most obvious advantage of Title IV’s approach is
that this information can be used to make each fund’s market activity
significantly more transparent, thereby allowing investors and
counterparties to more accurately ascribe the fund’s level of risk. From
this standpoint, mandatory disclosure is intended to protect other, more
systemically important, market participants, such as prime brokerages
(some of which were bailed out at the height of the credit crisis), by
bolstering the effectiveness of market discipline.121 Of course, greater
transparency will also have the added benefit of enhancing investor
protection by preventing investment manager fraud.122
While there is a tendency to view “smaller funds” as systemically
non-important, Section 408 includes a provision for the registration of
“mid-size” funds that do not meet the $150 million threshold.123
Registration of these funds will not be automatic, however, and will
only be required on an ad-hoc basis where the SEC determines that the
fund may pose a systemic risk.124 Because Section 408 does not define a
“mid-size” fund, the impact of Section 408 on this segment of the
industry is not immediately clear. Moreover, the Act also does not
specifically address smaller funds that may incorporate high leverage
amounts.125 Currently, there remains the distinct possibility that this
class of funds will be spared the burdens of increased disclosure.126
Title IV’s focus on disclosure provides market participants with
the information necessary to enhance market discipline while providing
regulators with a better insight into the build-up of systemic risk within
the financial system.127 Perhaps U.S. Deputy Secretary Neal Wolin
stated it best when he remarked that, “to constrain systemic risk
effectively, the Council [FSOC] and its members must be able to
monitor systemic risk effectively.”128 In this way, disclosure helps
120. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, 46–47.
121. See Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing Before H. Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, of the H. Committee on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 12–14 (2009) (statement of W. Todd Groome, Chairman,
Alternative Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n (AIMA)).
122. See ACHARYA, supra note 86, at 357.
123. See Dodd-Frank Act § 408.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary, Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at the Georgetown
University McDonough School of Business (Oct. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.benzinga.com/life/politics/10/10/550287/deputy-secretary-neal-s-wolin-remarks-atgeorgetown-university-mcdonough-.
128. Id.
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ensure that market regulators are not fighting yesterday’s battles.
Because a large amount of the most important fund information will not
be made public, however, the effectiveness of this approach as a
regulatory instrument will likely be determined by the extent to which
regulators are able to proficiently wield it.129
Aside from its impact on transparency, it does not appear that Title
IV will directly impact a fund’s ability to generate unwanted market
externalities resulting from concentrated investment positions. To be
sure, while stronger market discipline may reduce the extent to which
the use of leverage can promote market concentration, the Act does not
prohibit fund managers from engaging in high-risk strategies, nor does
it impose any direct form of leverage restriction or liquidity
requirements.130 At this time, the Act only instructs the SEC to conduct
a study regarding the feasibility of requiring hedge funds to report, in
real-time, their short-sale positions.131
4. The Role of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
What is surely one of the most significant, if not most
controversial, means by which the Act addresses the build of systemic
risk is through the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) under Section 111.132 The Act envisions the FSOC, which will
be chaired by the U.S. Treasury Secretary and will include members of
the Federal Reserve Board, will play a vital role in determining which
market participants are systematically important enough to warrant
increased federal oversight.133 The creation of the FSOC is an important
step in containing the build-up of systemic risk because the FSOC can
overcome the inherent collective action problem that can undermine the
effectiveness of market discipline. Due to the potential for the
disorderly unwinding of concentrated market positions under certain
conditions, it may not be enough to know about a counterparty’s
position vis-à-vis a particular fund.134 Consequently, the FSOC’s ability
to compile information about the aggregate exposure of all market
participants who may be forced to unwind their positions significantly
enhances the traditional, market-based, regulatory system.
129. See John Carney, Hedge Funds: The Next Too Big To Fail Monsters, CNBC.COM (Jan.
13, 2011), http://www.cnbc.com/id/41056905.
130. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 115, 619.
131. Id. § 727. At the time of writing, the SEC was still in the preliminary stages of
conducting its investigation on this very significant topic.
132. Id. § 111.
133. See Wolin, supra note 127.
134. See Engert, supra note 4, at 345.
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Undoubtedly, determining which hedge funds should be
considered systemically important is complicated by the fact that hedge
funds are heterogeneous; not all funds pursue the same strategy or
operate in the same markets. Consequently, many hedge funds may not
be systemically important at all.135 In considering which funds to deem
systemically important, the FSOC proposes a comprehensive list of
eleven “considerations” it will follow in identifying important funds to
be subject to the FSOC’s supervision.136 These considerations include:
“the extent of . . . leverage of the [fund][;]” the fund’s “off-balancesheet exposures[;]” the “interconnectedness” of the fund; and the fund’s
relationships with other market participants.137
Of course, the ability for the FSOC to oversee, and potentially
intrude upon, fund manager activity under certain conditions is highly
controversial.138 To some in the industry, the competitiveness of U.S.
financial institutions “will, under this new structure, inevitably be
subordinated to supervisory judgments about what these firms can
safely be allowed to do.”139 There also remains the question of whether a
fund that comes under the supervision of the FSOC will be allowed to
fail.140 However, when construed against the other alternatives, namely,
to exclude any form of final oversight, the creation of the FSOC
represents the most effective option for providing a last line of defense
absent more direct forms of regulation.141 Furthermore, at this time, the
concerns surrounding the FSOC’s authority in this area may prove to be
unfounded because it is unclear that the FSOC is even convinced that
hedge funds can present a systemic risk.142
While it is certainly difficult to make the argument that increased
disclosure is a step in the wrong direction, there are some early
indications that suggest that enhanced disclosure may entail some
135. See Ronald D. Orol, SEC Defends Tighter Rules for Some Hedge Funds
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-defendstighter-rules-for-some-hedge-funds-2010-10-26.
136. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 12 CFR CHAPTER XII: ADVANCE NOTICE
OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF
CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES, FR Doc. 2010-2532, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/2010-25321_PI.pdf [hereinafter FSOC Proposal].
137. Id.
138. See Rachelle Younglai and Dave Clarke, Hedge Funds May Skirt Direct Fed Scrutiny,
REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2010, 3:00PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/20/us-fedhedgefunds-idUSTRE6BJ4O220101220.
139. Peter Wallison, The Dodd-Frank Act: Creative Action, Destroyed, AM. ENTERPRISE
INST. (Aug. 30, 2010), available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/100983.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Younglai & Clark, supra note 138.
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unintended consequences. Most notably, the cost of complying with the
new rules is predicted to be a major consideration in determining the
economic viability of many smaller funds.143 Due to the predicted cost
of compliance, many smaller funds that will be subject to registration
may be forced to merge with larger funds that are generally viewed by
investors as more stable.144 Moreover, there is also the fear that the
continued consolidation of the industry will inspire “money managers[,]
who might otherwise [establish] their own [funds],” to work for the
larger, more established funds.145 Consequently, the act may have the
effect of moving the industry in the direction of increasingly larger
funds, which could present the same systemic problems that the
legislation was intended to reduce.146
B. The Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD)
1. The AIFMD: Aims and Background
In accordance with the European Union’s pre-existing regulatory
regime, investment funds have been categorized as either UCITS or
non-UCITS.147 The former includes pension and mutual funds that are
available on the retail market and are strictly regulated under the UCITS
Directive (85/611/EEC).148 The latter, also known as “alternative
investment funds,” encompasses private equity and hedge funds—
which will now fall under the auspices of the AIFMD.149 Prior to the
creation of the directive, the regulation of non-UCITS solely resided
with the regulatory body of the fund’s home member-state.150 In fact,
prior to the passage of the AIFMD, there was not a single European
community law that specifically addressed hedge fund manager
activity.151 As the financial crisis demonstrated, this patchwork
regulation did not effectively manage the inherent cross-border risks
associated with hedge fund activities. In its assessment of the key
impacts of the AIFMD, the EU Commission Staff reported that, “the
inability to piece together a comprehensive picture of AIFM leverage
143. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 129.
144. E.g., Bigger, Safer but Duller, supra note 3.
145. Carney, supra note 129.
146. Id.
147. Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers: Impact
Assessment, at 4, COM (2009) 207 (Apr. 30, 2009).
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 44.
151. See generally id. (proposing AIFMD in the absence of other EU law).
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and activities in all major European markets is a major flaw in existing
systems[.]”152 As a result, the AIFMD was established independently for
the specific purpose of regulating private pools of capital.153 According
to the directive’s text, “the Directive aims at establishing a framework
capable of addressing the potential risks that might arise from the
activities of AIFMs and ensuring the effective monitoring of those risks
by the competent authorities within the Union.”154
Passed by the European Parliament and European Council in the
fall of 2010, the AIFMD represents the most aggressive and
comprehensive measure taken by the EU to establish unified standards
for regulating hedge fund activity within the Union. Although, as
recently as 2006 the European Commission conducted a study on the
European hedge fund industry that called for regulators to further a
policy of allowing fund managers to pursue a strategy of “enlightened
self interest.”155 The initial draft of the current directive was notable for
being far more extreme than its U.S. counterpart.156 The lack of an
existing framework also made the drafting of the directive a
painstakingly slow process that consumed over two years, largely
because of member state disagreements over the scope of the proposed
reforms.157 Most prominent among these disputes was the issue of the
so-called European “passport,” which involved the question of whether
a fund’s compliance with the provisions of the directive would allow
that fund to solicit investors in all member states.158
A number of influential members, particularly France and
Germany, opposed the creation of a passport system, arguing that
member states should be able to enact their own domestic regulations in
152. Id. at 18.
153. This process was not lost on some industry leaders during the drafting of Dodd-Frank,
who argued that the EU’s tailored approach—which distinguished hedge funds from other types
of private investments—was superior to the American “patchwork” approach, which did not. See
Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing Oversight of
Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 45–46 (2009) (statement of James S. Chanos, Chairman, The
Coalition of Private Investment Companies).
154. See Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31, at 14.
155. EUROPEAN COMMISSION INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES DG, REPORT OF THE
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT GROUP TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: MANAGING, SERVICING,
AND MARKETING HEDGE FUNDS IN EUROPE 4 (July 2006).
156. See generally Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31.
157. Georges A. Boivin, Cayman Islands: EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers: Uncertainty and More Delays – Prospective from a Swiss Point of View, MONDAQ
(Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.mondaq.in/article.asp?articleid=107528.
158. See EU Agrees “Imperfect” Deal to Regulate Hedge Funds, EURACTIV.COM (Oct. 27,
2010), http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/eu-agrees-imperfect-deal-regulat-news-499194.
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addition to those contained in the AIFMD.159 In the end, however, the
reality of squandering an opportunity to reform this important
industry—helped in no small part by the extensive lobbying efforts of
the UK and the hedge fund industry—was too high a political cost, and
the passport system prevailed.160 The AIFMD, however, has not been
without its detractors. Indeed, one of the most prevalent critiques of this
process is that regulators have placed “the cart before the horse” by not
addressing more immediate systemic concerns, such as the size of large
financial institutions, short selling, and the use of derivatives—areas
that played a more visible role in the onset of the financial crisis.161
2. The AIFMD: Regulatory Approach
The AIFMD prohibits fund managers from managing or marketing
a hedge fund to professional investors in the EU unless the fund
manager has been authorized in accordance with the terms of the
directive.162 The primary advantage of this “passport” system is that
authorized fund managers will be allowed to market and solicit funds in
every member country without having to receive regulatory
authorization on an individualized basis. According to Article 4 of the
directive, hedge funds will be classified as “Alternative Investment
Funds” (AIF), defined as any “collective investment . . . which raises
capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it in
accordance with a defined investment policy” and is not authorized
pursuant to Article 5 of the Directive 2009/65/EC.163 Like its U.S.
counterpart, the AIFMD restricts investor access to hedge funds to only
those individuals and institutions qualified as a “professional
investor.”164
Encompassing the so-called “passport” provision, Article 32
provides that any EU authorized fund may market shares to professional
investors in any member state.165 Correspondingly, hedge funds
managed outside of the EU must comply with the provisions of the
directive, in accordance with Article 39, in order to gain access to EU

159. Id.; see also Stephen Fidler, Hedge Fund Talks: The End Game? WALL ST. J., Sept. 28,
2010, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2010/09/28/hedge-fund-directive-the-end-game/.
160. See EU Agrees “Imperfect” Deal to Regulate Hedge Funds, supra note 158.
161. Andrew
Baker,
The
Long,
HFMWEEKONLINE
(Dec.
13,
2010),
http://www.hfmweek.com/blogs/the-long/650977/comment-andrew-baker.thtml.
162. Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31, art. 6.
163. Id. art. 4(a).
164. See id. art. 4(af)-(ag).
165. Id. art. 32(1).
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community investors.166 In addition, the foreign fund must also ensure
that arrangements are made to coordinate the flow of information
between the regulatory authority of the fund’s home country and the
appropriate authorities in the member state.167 Initially, the passport
regime was the cause of much consternation in the United States due to
the fear that U.S. managed funds would have to comply with the
directive or else risk being locked out of the European market.168
However, this fear appears to have dissipated recently as it is widely
suspected that the directive will consider the U.S. regulatory
requirements to satisfy the directive’s prerequisites.169 Ironically, for
reasons discussed below, it may now be less expensive for U.S. based
hedge funds to solicit funds from investors in member states than it is
for union countries.
Currently, the implementation of the AIFMD is planned to consist
of at least three phases.170 Phase One covers the authorization of, and the
operating conditions for, the AIFM Directive.171 The second phase will
establish provisions regarding “depository requirements.”172 The third,
phase will address provisions relating to transparency requirements and
the use of leverage.173 At the time of writing, however, only Phase One
has been passed with the subsequent phases to be drafted and voted on
in the coming months. Consequently, although the basic regulatory
framework is now in place, the detail of the directive’s provisions will
become more apparent in the months ahead.
Structurally, the AIFMD, like the Dodd-Frank Act, targets the
investment manager rather than the fund itself.174 Moreover, the size of
the fund’s assets under management is also the determining factor in
classifying which funds will be subject to the directive’s
requirements.175 In accordance with Article 3, two classes of hedge fund
managers will now be subject to heightened regulatory scrutiny.176 The
166. Id. art. 39(1).
167. Id. art. 39(2).
168. See Investing: Alternative Visions, supra note 6.
169. Hester Plumridge, Hedge Funds Win Big in Brussels, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2010),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304741404575564133358359888.html.
170. Provisional Request to CESR for Technical Advice on Possible Level 2 Measures
Concerning the Future Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers § I.1, COM (2010)
892960 final (Dec. 2, 2010).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See generally Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31.
175. See id. art. 26.
176. See id. art. 3(2).
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first class will be comprised of those fund managers using leverage with
over €100 million in assets under management.177 The second class will
broadly consist of managers with total assets of over €500 million,
regardless of the use of leverage.178 By triggering registration at a lower
figure for those funds using leverage, Article 3 directly addresses a
category of funds that Dodd-Frank does not—smaller funds that
incorporate significant amounts of leverage into their investment
portfolios.179 For those funds that do meet the Directive’s threshold,
Article 6 still requires the fund manager to register with the regulatory
authority of their home Member State.180 These smaller funds, however,
may “opt-in” under Article 32 to avail themselves of access to
professional investors in other union member states.181 Under the
AIFMD, member states will have two years to establish the domestic
legislation necessary to implement the Directive before it becomes
effective in January 2013.182 After that date, fund managers will have up
to one year to comply with the Directive’s requirements.183 For those
funds managed outside of the EU, the wait will be considerably longer
because the directive will not become effective until 2015.184
3. The AIFMD: Addressing the Concerns Regarding Counterparty
Risk and Disorderly Market Pricing
The most salient feature of the AIFMD is the transfer of national
regulatory control over alternative investments to EU standards, at least
with respect to systemically important funds. While the Directive
establishes trans-national standards, the primary responsibility for
ensuring fund manager compliance with the Directive will reside not
with EU authorities but with regulators in the fund’s home member
state.185 The European Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA), the
financial regulatory authority of the EU, will retain primary
responsibility for regulating foreign hedge funds and may coordinate
with member states to establish protective measures for member-state

177. Id. art. 3(2)(a)
178. Id. art. 3(2)(b).
179. Id. art. 3.
180. Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31, art. 6.
181. Id. art. 32.
182. Nikki Tait & Martin Arnold, Brussles Agrees to Hedge Fund Rules, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/74a47cf8-e0f5-11df-87da00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Z5WEgRXy.
183. Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31 arts. 32(2), 51.
184. Tait, supra note 182.
185. See Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31 arts. 5–6.
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funds.186
Although the AIFMD and the Dodd-Frank Act promote fund
manager disclosure as the cornerstone of their respective frameworks, it
is clear that regulators under the AIFMD will retain a significantly
greater degree of direct regulatory control over fund manager activity
than those in the United States. Specifically, the AIFMD addresses the
relationship between hedge fund activity and systemic risk in two ways.
First, Chapter IV of the Directive requires fund managers to make
comprehensive disclosures to both investors and to the regulatory body
of home member state.187 Second, Chapter V of the Directive grants
both the member state and the ESMA the power to monitor, and even
limit, the degree to which fund managers may incorporate leverage.188
Like the Dodd-Frank Act, the most salient feature of the AIFMD is
the degree to which fund managers will be required to disclose their
investment activities. Once the Directive becomes effective, fund
managers will be required to submit annual reports to investors
disclosing, among other things: a current balance sheet, the fund’s
investment strategy, and the circumstances in which the fund may
incorporate leverage into its investment strategy.189 Under Article 24,
fund managers will also be required to provide a more detailed annual
report to regulators in the fund’s home member state.190 Specifically, the
report must include information regarding the instruments and markets
in which the fund is invested, the main categories of assets in which the
fund is invested, and the percentage of the fund’s illiquid assets.191 In
addition, the Directive takes the remarkable step of requiring each fund
manager to establish a maximum level of leverage that the fund may
incorporate into its strategy.192
The Directive’s disclosure requirements seek to limit systemic risk
in two important ways. First, as discussed above, disclosure enhances
market discipline by providing counterparties and other market
participants with the information necessary to implement effective risk
management policies. In doing so, the Directive, like the Dodd-Frank
Act, aims to protect other systemically important institutions that
maintain relationships with hedge funds by enhancing market discipline.
186. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.
187. Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31, arts. 22–24.
188. Id. art. 25.
189. Id. art. 19.
190. Id. art. 24.
191. Id. art. 21. Furthermore, the directive grants the appropriate authorities the ability to
request further information on an ad hoc basis. Id. art. 47.
192. Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31, art. 22.
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Of course, the degree to which the Directive’s disclosure requirements
will enhance market discipline depends in large part on the actions of
individual counterparties, as well as future industry reforms aimed at the
fund-creditor relationship.
Second, the Directive also addresses the problem of systemic risk
by providing regulators in both the home Member State and the ESMA
with detailed fund information that can help these authorities identify
the extent to which the fund’s use of leverage contributes to the build up
of systemic risk.193 According to one analysis of the directive’s impact,
although there is no clear evidence that proves that disclosure of the
fund’s use of leverage to investors reduces systemic risk, such
disclosure is “necessary in order to improve macro-prudential
oversight.”194 As mentioned earlier, the extent to which regulators under
the AIFMD can exercise direct control over fund manager activity
represents the most significant divergence with the Dodd-Frank Act.
Nowhere is this departure more apparent than in the enormous power
granted to the regulatory authorities of the fund’s home member state
under Article 7. Specifically, the Article provides individual state
regulators with the authority to restrict the scope of the fund manager’s
authorization by placing limitations directly on the fund’s investment
strategy.195
4. The Role of European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
So what happens in the event that regulators determine that a
hedge fund presents an unacceptable systemic risk? Article 25 provides
that home-State regulators, under advisement with the ESMA and the
newly created European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), can restrict the
fund’s use of leverage as well as place “restrictions” on the management
of the fund.196 Moreover, the ability for regulators to restrict the use of
leverage is not necessarily fund-specific, as restrictions can be placed on
particular groups of funds.197 Similarly, Article 45 affords ESMA with
the power not only to prohibit the marketing of non-member funds
within the union, but also to impose restrictions on non-member fund
managers where their activities are believed to present a systemic or
counterparty risk.198 In this way, the role of the ESMA as a fund
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. art. 25(1).
MALCOLM, supra note 81, at 88.
Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31, art. 7.
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 42.
See id. art. 45.
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overseer may be much like the Financial Services Oversight Committee
in the United States.199
A closer inspection of Article 45 reveals that home-State
regulators, under Article 25, will have broader authority to impose
restrictions than the EU-level ESMA. This is because Article 45
delineates the particular circumstances that will trigger the exercise of
the ESMA’s authority. Specifically, the ESMA may take action where a
“substantial threat” exists with respect to the cross-border financial
system and where home-State authorities have not taken sufficient
measures to address the threat.200 The scope of the ESMA’s authority to
act, however, is severely limited under the same Article because of the
mandate that the organization’s actions must not create the risk of
regulatory arbitrage or hamper the efficiency of the financial markets in
a disproportionate manner.201 Consequently, the narrow parameters in
which the ESMA may act could have a chilling effect on the
organization’s incentive to take immediate action. Furthermore, the
Directive does not provide an explanation of what a “substantial threat”
constitutes, making it unclear whether such a threat would relate solely
to the build-up of systemic risk or threats to other areas of the market in
which the fund does not transact.
The effectiveness of the Directive’s ability to constrain systemic
risk will significantly depend on a number of variables, not the least of
which will include the ability of home-State authorities and the ESMA
to seamlessly cooperate, as well as the timeliness of imposing leverage
restrictions. As to the former, although Article 48 of the Directive
obligates home-State authorities and the ESMA to cooperate, the
Directive conspicuously fails to provide the ESMA with final decisionmaking authority.202 In the event of a disagreement between these
parties, the Directive will instead require ESMA mediation.203 Of
course, while the likelihood of a significant disagreement may
ultimately be non-existent, the European Union’s ongoing solvency
problems have demonstrated that collective action amongst Member
States is not necessarily a given when it comes to economic policy

199. At this stage, however, the scope of ESMA’s authority is much more defined than the
American FSOC.
200. Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31, art. 47.
201. Id.
202. Id. art. 48; see Mirzha de Manuel, Why Passport Flexibility Comes at a Price FIN. TIMES
(Dec.
12,
2010),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3277e83e-048f-11e0-a99c00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Z69q3lTo.
203. See Council Directive 2011/16, supra note 31, art. 48.
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matters.204 Furthermore, the lack of overriding decision-making
authority could also mean that coordination in times of crisis could be
dangerously slow.
Regarding the latter, according to one impact assessment, the
ability for regulators to restrict the use of leverage in extraordinary
circumstances may not even address the actual build-up of systemic
risk.205 In fact, one of the most prevalent concerns regarding the use of
leverage restrictions is that the limitations themselves may actually
intensify the ability for hedge funds to generate externalities.206
According to the same study, the imposition of leverage restrictions will
likely result in an environment in which fund managers will operate
close to the designated leverage limitations.207 Consequently, in the
event that market conditions deteriorate, these funds may be forced to
sell assets “beyond what might be necessary from the perspective of
retaining sufficient collateral with brokers” to stay within the leverage
limitations.208 Another inherent limitation on the Directive’s impact is
the modest size of the European hedge fund industry itself. As of late
2009, only 5 percent of the global hedge fund industry was based in the
EU, with only an estimated 26 percent of all hedge fund assets managed
within the European community.209 Thus, the effectiveness of actions
taken by the relevant European authorities may be quite limited where
the conditions giving rise to financial instability reside outside of the
EU.
V. CONCLUSION
So, have the United States and the EU fallen out of step on hedge
fund reform? Although this remained a distinct possibility in early 2010,
the final legislation passed on both sides of the Atlantic shows that the
two sides have largely ended up in the same place. In being the first
member of the G-20 to pass financial reform in this area, U.S. policy
makers hoped that the Dodd-Frank Act would provide the model the
rest of world would adopt.210 Thus far, however, this goal has failed to
204. See, e.g., Mohamed El-Erian, Europe Is Running Fast to Stand Still, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17,
2011),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/89c3e2bc-222d-11e0-b91a00144feab49a.html#axzz1ZHzkF2Ze.
205. MALCOLM, supra note 81, at 4.
206. Id. at 90.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 90–91.
210. Tom Braithwaite & Francesco Guerrera, Financial Regulation: A Garden to Tame FIN.
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2010),
http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/90873016-f016-11df-88db-
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materialize. Both sides have rightly decided to make disclosure the
centerpiece of their respective reform agendas without implementing
measures that will make compliance too onerous from a competitive
standpoint.211 The financial reforms adopted by the United States and
the EU do show that differences remain, however. Without question,
fund managers in the EU will face a greater level of regulatory scrutiny
than their American competitors. By contrast, in the United States, there
still remains the question of what form the FSOC will take, if one will
ever take form at all. What is sure is that even with these reforms in
place the global hedge fund industry will likely consolidate, albeit while
continuing to grow. Amidst all this uncertainty, only time will reveal the
true measure of whether policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic
have achieved their goals of implementing a more stable industry—or,
conversely, whether these recent reforms will have planted the seeds
from which the next major crisis will grow.
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